

Message Text

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67

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

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O 062121Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9069

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

USINT ALGIERS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BRUSSELS 6312

EXDIS

DEPT PASS USINT CAIRO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR XF XG EEC

SUBJECT: DECLARATION OF THE NINE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

SECRET

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REF: BRUSSELS 6275

1. AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM, CALLED ON FOREIGN
MINISTER VAN ELSLANDE THIS EVENING TO OBTAIN HIS

APPRAISAL OF THE MIDDLE EAST DECLARATION OF THE NINE (REFTEL).
THE FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE
DECLARATION CITING TWO ELEMENTS IN PARTICULAR. A. IT IS A
NOTABLE EVENT THAT THE NINE HAVE NOW REACHED AN AGREEMENT ON
A POSITION CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS ASSURES THAT THEY
WILL NOT BE TALKING TO THE MIDDLE EAST AS QUOTE EIGHT AND ONE,
UNQUOTE AND THAT THE MIDDLE EAST CANNOT DEAL WITH EIGHT EC
COUNTRIES BUT MUST NOW DEAL WITH A UNIFIED POSITION OF THE NINE.
COMMENT: WHILE THE FOREIGN MINISTER DID NOT ELABORATE, HE
PRESUMABLY ALLUDES TO THE PREVIOUS SITUATION IN WHICH THE
DUTCH AND PERHAPS THE FRENCH WERE TAKING A LINE DIFFERENT
FROM OTHER EC GOVERNMENTS. B. WHILE THE MAIN THOUGHTS IN THE
DECLARATION COME FROM SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, IT IS
SIGNIFICANT THAT THESE ARE NOW ENDORSED FOR THE FIRST TIME BY
ALL THE EC MEMBER GOVERNMENTS.

2. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT CONCEPTS IN PARA 3, (I), (II), AND
(III) OF THE DECLARATION WERE EMBODIED, ALTHOUGH NOT IN IDENTICAL
LANGUAGE, IN SC RESOLUTION 242, BUT THAT PARA (IV) CONCERNING
"LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS" WAS NOT TO BE FOUND
THERE. THE FOREIGN MINISTER AGREED THAT THIS LANGUAGE GOES
BEYOND THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BUT STRESSED THAT
SITUATION OF THE PALESTINIANS IS AT THE ROOT OF THE WHOLE
MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AND COULD NOT BE IGNORED IN THE STATEMENT
BY THE NINE. COMMENT: HE DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE FOCUSED ON
NUANCES OF LANGUAGE IN THE DECLARATION; FOR EXAMPLE, WHETHER
IT IS "ASPIRATIONS" OR "RIGHTS" OF PALESTINIANS THAT SHOULD
BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

3. WHEN ASKED ABOUT VARIATIONS FROM THE LANGUAGE IN THE
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN THE DECLARATION AND IN
PARTICULAR THE FORMULATION IN PARA 3, (II), CONCERNING THE NEED
FOR ISRAEL TO "END THE TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION" MAINTAINED SINCE
1967, THE FOREIGN MINISTER CREDITED THIS FORMULATION TO HIS
CHEF DE CABINET NOTERDAEME, WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT FOR MUCH
OF OUR CONVERSATION. THE FOREIGN MINISTER STATED THAT EARLY
THIS MORNING THE NINE MINISTERS HAD ACCEPTED THE COMPLETE
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TEXT WORKED OUT BY THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS. NOTERDAEME COMMENTED
THAT THE LANGUAGE ON ENDING "TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION" WAS
INTRODUCED BECAUSE IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO KEEP REPEATING THE
WORDS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. HE CONSIDERED THAT
THIS FORMULATION WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS
IN MUCH THE SAME WAY AS SC 242 BUT THAT IT HAD THE MERIT OF
PERMITTING AGREEMENT BY THE NINE ON ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEXTS
THAT ARE THE SAME. COMMENT: IT WAS PRESUMABLY CONSIDERED
UNTENABLE TO HAVE FRENCH AND ENGLISH VERSIONS OF THE
DECLARATION DIFFER ON THIS POINT OF INTENSE INTEREST TO THE
ARABS.

4. THE AMBASSADOR INQUIRED ABOUT THE INTENTIONS OF THE NINE

REGARDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO OCT 22 POSITIONS AND THE
RELATIONSHIP OF WITHDRAWAL TO THE ISSUE OF THE ISRAELI
PRISONERS OF WAR. HE NOTED THAT THE FORMULATION WOULD SEEM
TO GIVE PRIORITY TO WITHDRAWAL AND TO MAKE IT A PREREQUISITE
FOR A SOLUTION OF THE PRISONER OF WAR ISSUE. VAN ELSLANDE,
WHO ADMITTED TO EXTREME FATIGUE, FOLLOWING THE LATE-NIGHT,
EARLY-MORNING SESSION, REPLIED ONLY OBLIQUELY. HE APPEARED
TO GIVE PRIORITY TO A RETURN TO THE OCT 22 LINES, ON THE
GROUNDS THAT THE ISRAELI ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY
AFTER THAT DATE WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH FIRST IN
ORDER TO MAKE POSSIBLE AN AGREEMENT ON OTHER ISSUES.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USINT CAIRO.

SECRET

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EXDIS

5. IN A SEPARATE BRIEF CONVERSATION, NOTERDAEME URGED THAT WE OBTAIN A CAREFUL READING OF PARA 2 OF THE DECLARATION FROM POLITICAL DIRECTOR DAVIGNON, WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE DRAFTING SESSION IN BRUSSELS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE LANGUAGE REFERRING TO NEGOTIATIONS "IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS" WOULD NOT SQUARE WITH US INTEREST IN HAVING THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE SECRET

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"AUSPICES" OF THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE NINE ATTACHED SPECIAL IMPORTANCE, HOWEVER, TO HAVING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN A UN FRAMEWORK. AT THE SAME TIME THEY HAD AVOIDED ADVOCACY OF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE "AUSPICES" OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WHICH WOULD DRAMATIZE A DIFFERENCE WITH THE UNITED STATES.

6. WHEN ASKED ABOUT ANY RELATIONSHIP OF THE DECLARATION TO POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT THE SUPPLY OF OIL FROM THE ARAB STATES, THE FOREIGN MINISTER STATED THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED TO FORMULATE THE DECLARATION IN BROAD POLITICAL TERMS RATHER THAN IN THE MORE LIMITED CONTEXT OF MIDDLE EAST OIL. HE THEN PUT SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE CONCEPT IN PARA 5 OF THE DECLARATION, WHICH REMINDS THE MIDDLE EAST STATES THAT THE NINE, AT THE OCT 1972 SUMMIT HAD EXPRESSED THEIR WILL TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS WITH CERTAIN MEDITERRANEAN STATES. HE IMPLIED THAT THE NINE WERE CALLING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ARABS THAT THE WHOLE FUTURE OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WAS AT STAKE.

7. WHEN ASKED ABOUT WHAT STEPS MIGHT NEXT BE CONTEMPLATED BY THE NINE, AND PARTICULARLY THEIR INTENTIONS IN RESERVING " THE RIGHT TO MAKE PROPOSALS CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES" (PARA 4 OF DECLARATION), VAN ELSLANDE STATED THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT ON WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN NEXT. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE MEETING, HOWEVER, ON NOV 20 IN COPENHAGEN, AND AT THAT TIME THEY COULD TAKE STOCK OF THE SITUATION AND DETERMINE HOW THEY SHOULD PROCEED. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE ARAB REACTION.

8. VAN ELSLANDE INQUIRED WHETHER THE DECLARATION WOULD PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR THE US, WHICH HE VERY MUCH HOPED WOULD NOT BE THE CASE. AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT IN THE DECLARATION, THERE WERE VARIOUS NEW FORMULATIONS THAT DIFFERED FROM POSITIONS BEING PUT FORWARD BY US, BUT DOD NOT WISH TO PREJUDGE OR ANTICIPATE REACTION OF US OFFICIALS MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN FAST-MOVING NEGOTIATIONS. HE WONDERED, HOWEVER, WHETHER DECLARATION MIGHT NOT LEAD TO A TOUGHER BARGAINING STANCE BY THE ARABS, WHICH WE WOULD CONSIDER REGRETTABLE.

9. THE FOREIGN MINISTER THANKED THE US FOR THE NVEWS WHICH AMBASSADOR HAD CONVEYED TO DAVIGNIN ON NOV 5, WHICH HE STATED HAD BEEN HELPFUL. STRAUZ-HUPE
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NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USINT CAIRO.

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COPENHAGEN
DUBLIN
LONDON
LUXEMBOURG
PARIS
ROME

THE HAGUE
EC BRUSSELS
NATO BRUSSELS
USUN NY
TEL AVIV
TRIPOLI
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